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“WON’T YOU TELL ME, WHERE HAVE 
ALL THE GOOD TIMES GONE?”
On the Advantages and Disadvantages of  
Modernization Theory for Historical Study
Chris Lorenz

In 1975 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, who founded the so-called Bielefeld School of  his-
tory together with Jürgen Kocka and Reinhart Koselleck, published a small book 
titled Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte.1 This book, much read and quoted from 
since then, included a summary and a critical appraisal of  the primarily sociologi-
cal and political theories of  modernization from the viewpoint of  the so-called 
“historians of  society.”2 Historians of  society strove to integrate history and the 
social sciences into a “historical social science” and therefore wanted to borrow 
theories from the social sciences.3 For this reason Wehler tried to summarize the 
advantages and disadvantages of  modernization theory. In order to enable his 
readers to balance the advantages and the disadvantages of  modernization theories 
for themselves, he went into considerable detail.4 Against modernization theory he 
listed, among others, the following arguments:
1. Modernization theories take Western and especially US society as the im-
plicit model for “modern” societies in general.
2. Theories of  modernization presuppose a unilinear developmental logic 
from tradition to the US-type of  modernity. They therefore presuppose one 
unifi ed premodern tradition and the superiority of  the West over the non-
West.
3. Theories of  modernization dichotomize world history into a phase of  tra-
dition and a phase of  modernity, reducing world history to a transformation 
process from tradition to modernity (i.e., modernization).
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4. Theories of  modernization presuppose a unifi ed development of  an inte-
grated system without consideration of  regressive developments of  subsys-
tems. This lacuna was important because it led the Bielefeld School to inter-
pret fascism in terms of  the “uneven development” of  the economic and the 
political subsystems of  Germany and Japan.
5. Theories of  modernization presuppose that social systems are in a state of  
equilibrium, which entails focusing on structures instead of  processes.
6. Theories of  modernization implicitly identify the social system with the 
nation-state.
7. Theories of  modernization are characterized by an underestimation of  the 
role of  politics.
8. Theories of  modernization do not conceptualize power, confl ict, and inter-
ests in adequate ways.
Wehler’s list of  objections was so fundamental and extensive that many read-
ers could well ask themselves whether it was reasonable at all for historians to 
apply modernization theories to history. Wehler, however, answered this ques-
tion emphatically in the affi rmative—and this still held true twenty years later 
(1995) when he republished his text in an unchanged form.5 Nor did he leave 
the reader in the dark concerning the reasons for his preference for moderniza-
tion theories. His list of  arguments for the application of  modernization theo-
ries in history was at least as extensive as the criticism he outlined in the preced-
ing section:
1. Theories of  modernization represent the most differentiated conceptual 
instrument for comprehending the “dynamic of  the singular evolutionary 
process” the world has been going through since the Industrial and French 
Revolutions.6
2. No superior alternative to theories of  modernization exists, including 
Marxism (the book was published when Marxist GDR historiography was 
still a competing German discourse). Moreover, Marxian theory represent-
ed only one variant of  the theory of  modernization, according to Wehler. 
That this might imply that modernization theories also share some of  the 
fundamental problems of  Marxism was not observed, however.
3. Theories of  modernization allow for “clearly specifying the normative 
elements of  the modernization concept,” that is, the liberal and demo-
cratic values that can be used as the normative foundation of  a societal 
critique. Responding to the Frankfurt School and especially to Jürgen 
Habermas, the Bielefeld School subscribed to the idea of  “critical social 
science” and regarded social science as continuing the “Enlightenment-
project.”
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4. Theories of  modernization offer typologies by which historians can identify 
the similarities and the differences in concrete historical processes of  mod-
ernization. Here Wehler was referring to the quite different “historical paths” 
to modernity taken by Germany in contrast to the rest of  the West. More-
over, modernization theories allow for the “formulation of  testable hypoth-
eses for the functional and causal explanation of  controversial phenomena.”
Wehler ended his balance of  modernization theories with the conclusion that 
“everything depends on empirically persuasive historical analyses.” “The proof  of  
the—modernization—pudding is in the eating”—and in this respect he surely 
was right.
The questions not clarifi ed in the text were how Wehler exactly weighed the pros 
and cons and why he ultimately did not consider the critical arguments against 
the theory of  modernization to be compelling. Regardless of  whether Wehler’s 
argument that there is “no rationally superior alternative to the theory of  mod-
ernization” is plausible for sociologists or political scientists, it defi nitely was no 
argument for historians who were not already convinced. They would change their 
mind only if  modernization theory were put to work in history in an innovative 
manner and they did not have to wait to see this happen.7
In 1973 Wehler had himself  presented an empirically based historical analysis 
structured by the theory of  modernization. His book Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871–
1918 rose rapidly to become a classic of  the history of  society and was translated 
into many languages.8 Although the author had already relativized the book as an 
“experiment” in 1977, by 1988 it had been reprinted unchanged fi ve times.9 No 
one working professionally in the fi eld of  modern German history could ignore 
Wehler’s “modernized” Kaiserreich. The book was read, praised, and criticized on a 
massive scale—which in itself  represents a huge success10. German historical social 
science guided by the theory of  modernization was presented for some time as a 
true paradigm shift that replaced traditional history, now disqualifi ed as both nar-
rowly political and as historicist.
Fundamental to the German conception of  history of  society was a critical 
version of  the Sonderweg-theory. This theory, which posited that Germany had 
taken a “special path” (Sonderweg) into modernity in comparison to the other ma-
jor powers of  the West, was now reformulated along the lines of  modernization 
theory.11 Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy functioned 
here as the basic historical framework.12 Moore interpreted the Prussic-German 
path into the modern age in the nineteenth century as a conservative revolution 
from above, in which economic modernization—industrialisation—and modern-
ization of  the state—bureaucratization of  the administration—were striven for, 
while at the same time traditional authoritarian political and social structures were 
largely retained. This type of  conservative revolution led, via authoritarian and dic-
tatorial forms of  state, to a reactionary-capitalist or fascist path into modernity. 
This path was fundamentally different from the democratic-capitalist route taken 
by England, France, and the USA, where economic modernization and political 
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modernization (extending democratic participation rights) proceeded more or less 
in parallel, while on the reactionary-capitalist path economic and political mod-
ernization proceeded non-synchronously.
Thus Moore’s theory of  modernization offers the possibility of  interpreting 
the absence of  democratic political institutions as a “delayed modernization” of  
the political system vis-à-vis the economic system. Historians of  society in Ger-
many have used Moore’s theory to explain the essentially undemocratic modern 
history of  Germany up to 1945.
Discontents with the Theory of  Modernization and 
the Crisis in the History of  Society in the 1990s
When Hans-Ulrich Wehler became professor emeritus in 1996, this occasion was 
used in Bielefeld to take stock of  his legacy. History of  society became the object 
of  refl ection again and found its expression in two anthologies. The fi rst volume, 
Nation und Gesellschaft in Deutschland, a festschrift for Wehler, contained essays by an 
imposing array of  historians and social scientists who by and large attested to the 
status of  history of  society as “normal science.” In 1996 the question “What is 
history of  society?” was no longer explicitly asked, as it still had been in 1991 in 
the festschrift for Wehler’s sixtieth birthday.
The second volume related to Wehler’s offi cial retirement in Bielefeld, titled 
Perspektiven der Gesellschaftsgeschichte, was not published until 2000.13 The tone of  this 
volume differs remarkably from that of  the festschrift of  1996: many of  its pas-
sages resemble more an in memoriam than a festive speech. Jürgen Kocka, for example, 
Wehler’s most important brother-in-arms in every historiographical war since the 
1960s, writes, “Things have quieted down around historical social science. To many 
the language of  the sixties and seventies sounds strange today. The distance between 
the discipline of  history and the social sciences seems to have grown again. . . . : 
Is historical social science perhaps becoming outdated already?”14 Kocka observed 
that “the wind has turned” and for the past ten years has been “blowing directly 
into the face of  historical social science.” “History is less than ever identical with 
historical social science,” he observed, and far away from the “argumentative turn” 
advocated by the proponents of  historical social science.15
Kocka historicized the Bielefeld project substantially through his account of  
its origins. He referred to the mutual support of  the critical practical orientation, 
the assumptions of  modernization theory, and the special path interpretation of  
modern German history. “With the help of  the assumptions of  modernization 
theory the special path interpretation of  German history was supported concep-
tually as a critical interpretation of  modern German history in comparison to 
the West, a view in which the explanation of  the catastrophe of  National Social-
ism was central.”16 “It was the specifi c historical constellation of  the sixties and 
seventies, which produced history as historical social science in West Germany. 
The social scientifi c colouring of  history was closely allied to the attempt at 
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and the possibility of  pursuing history as Enlightenment and of  learning from 
history. In the meantime, much more is expected of  history as well: appropria-
tion of  the past, memory, source and guarantee of  identity, occasionally even 
entertainment.”17
Wehler too felt the need on this occasion to put history of  society in the bal-
ance in the light of  its new “challenges.”18 Interestingly, he now made a direct 
connection between the boom phase of  history of  society and the theory of  mod-
ernization with its characteristic optimistic belief  in progress—without, however, 
refl ecting upon earlier standpoints, like his criticism in 1973 of  the relationship 
between the theory of  modernization and an optimistic belief  in progress, embod-
ied in the presupposition of  an unilinear evolutionary logic with the West (mean-
ing the US) as telos. Now Wehler made the following observations concerning the 
rise and fall of  modernization theories: “The phase of  political reform of  the late 
nineteen-sixties and seventies provided a tangible tailwind. The intellectual climate 
supported a relatively optimistic way of  thinking, which is why the theories of  
modernization were attractive for analysing long-lasting processes of  evolution.” 
He then stated succinctly that since then, a “discrediting of  the optimistic belief  
in progress” had taken place as a consequence of  “crises of  the environment and 
of  the economic growth, and of  inter-state and civil wars.” The younger generation 
was “deeply sceptical, not just in relation to the idea of  progress but even in rela-
tion to any concept of  evolution.”
Also, the “costs” of  the special path thesis—the cornerstone of  the Bielefeld 
conception of  history, previously defended vehemently against all critics19—were 
now acknowledged by Wehler. International relations, religion, law, war, and gen-
der—pretty much all topics central to the booming “new cultural history” since 
the 1980s—were now acknowledged as “gaps” in the Bielefeld conception of  his-
tory. “The pull of  the “special path” thesis in explaining the “break with civilisa-
tion” between 1933 and 1945 has undeniably demanded a high price,” he admit-
ted in the end.20
When Wehler and Kocka—founding fathers of  German history of  society—at 
the close of  the twentieth century both historicize and relativize the function of  
the modernization theory as well as the special path thesis, then one can speak 
of  a crisis in the history of  society: The theory of  modernization and the special 
path thesis both belong to the very foundations of  the German version of  history 
of  society, and without foundations even concrete structures “Made in Bielefeld” 
ultimately start tottering.
Before looking at the causes of  this crisis in more detail, I would like to make 
my crisis diagnosis broader by calling on two further witnesses (for the prosecu-
tion). I am referring to two young historians who are among the most talented off-
spring of  the Bielefeld founding generation: Paul Nolte, a top student of  Hans-
Ulrich Wehler (presently professor in Berlin at the Free University) and Thomas 
Welskopp, a top student of  Jürgen Kocka (presently professor in Bielefeld). Each 
wrote a review taking stock of  German history of  society that can easily be read as 
a crisis diagnosis of  the history of  society.
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In an overview in 1999 Nolte characterized the program of  history of  soci-
ety as something belonging to the Bonn Republic, in other words: as something 
belonging to the past.21 Typical of  German history of  society were a clear theo-
retical and methodological alignment with the West, a political commitment to 
Western democracy, and a clear rejection of  the Nazi past. Nolte claimed that all 
these orientations and alignments stemmed directly from the post war situation 
of  West Germany, including the belief  in the “promises of  American modernity” 
which found its expression in a strong predilection for sociological theories of  
modernization. This comment was remarkable, as Wehler had listed identifying 
“the” society with the USA as a point of  criticism of  the theory of  moderniza-
tion back in 1975. Nolte emphasized that for German historians of  society, 
society actually meant nation—especially the German nation, because most of  
them were writing German history. German history of  society therefore had re-
mained basically both national history and political history, its relentless critique 
of  traditional political history notwithstanding.22 This observation also repre-
sented a fundamental critique of  history of  society because Wehler had criticized 
the identifi cation of  society with the nation-state severely in 1975. Consequently, 
German history of  society inspired by the theory of  modernization came to be 
characterized by at least two fundamental problems that its advocates had con-
sciously tried to avoid.
The earlier success at the time of  the history of  society Nolte explained in the 
following way: “Their program—it was persuasive and formulated consistently 
enough around defi nite basic ideas and with an attraction reaching beyond its 
subject matter. And it captured the spirit of  the times, it was “timely,” equally 
infl uenced by the climate of  the late sixties as infl uencing it successfully in re-
turn.” Thus did Nolte again implicitly diagnose a crisis in the history of  society 
by relegating it to decades past in a passage that not by chance was formulated in 
the past tense.
A second crown witness concerning the crisis diagnosis of  history of  society is 
Thomas Welskopp.23 Like Nolte, Welskopp analyzed the history of  society as an 
intellectual product of  the post war situation of  West Germany, as an intellectual 
hybrid of  old German traditions and a new orientation to the USA Building on 
Theodor Schieder’s and Werner Conze’s “Strukturgeschichte” (structural history), 
the Bielefeld founding fathers had at fi rst turned to American sociological theories 
of  modernization24—and not just for theoretical reasons. Welskopp stressed that 
modernization was conceived in Bielefeld not just as a theoretical but also as a 
normative category: modernization was conceived as democratization, which was 
equivalent to Westernization. Western modernization did become the model—in 
the sense of  providing a virtual historical course of  normal development, which 
was regarded as the measure for the historical comparisons required by the pro-
gram and as the ideal against which historical processes could be measured. “The 
commitment to Western modernization was the expression of  a passionate iden-
tifi cation with the post war society of  West Germany in its progressive elements, 
that is to say, in those elements which were striving to be a match for the advanced 
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West. In the process, West Germany was anchored fi rmly in Western modernity, 
as a society which had learned its lessons through its catastrophic experience of  
National Socialism—implicitly opposing any claim that Germany should be com-
pared to Central-European states.25 So although Wehler had criticized modern-
ization theories for making US- and Western European history into the model 
for and the telos of  the rest of  the world, this was exactly what he had been doing 
himself  for German history, according to Nolte.
Thus German history of  society interpreted National Socialism as the cul-
minating point of  Germany’s “special path” and as the catastrophic endpoint of  
Germany’s delayed and partial modernization before 1945 (partial because politi-
cal modernization in the sense of  a stable democratization had been missing before 
1945). West German history therefore could be interpreted as a return to “normal” 
Western modernity after the German “special path” had been broken off  by the 
Allies in 1945. That would explain, according to Welskopp as well as Nolte, why 
the content of  German history of  society remained so exclusively focused on the 
German “special path” and on “1933,” and why it could not develop into anything 
other than what it had been: essentially, German national history. Welskopp as 
well as Nolte therefore both drew the inevitable conclusion that history of  society 
only could have a future after bidding farewell to the theory of  modernization to 
its fi xation on Germany’s “special path.”26
With the benefi t of  hindsight we can observe that East German history was glar-
ingly absent from German history of  society. The question of  what “the German 
nation” actually was could not be explicitly addressed because the GDR was implic-
itly excluded from German “society” (as was the German-Austrian nation had been 
before). This “exclusion” in turn can be explained by German history of  society’s 
identifi cation of  the notions of  “society,” “nation-state,” and the identifi cation of  
West Germany with the post war German nation-state. This circumstance too may 
explain why after 1990 German history of  society could not deal with the German 
unifi cation and lost much its former attraction for the younger generations.
The Theoretical Roots of  the Crisis of  German History of  Society
Although Nolte’s and Welskopp’s analyses of  the problems of  history of  society 
are convincing, they do not completely clarify the question of  the causes of  this 
“crisis.” Wehler and Kocka had put most emphasis on the political and cultural 
contexts that have demonstrably infl uenced the changing fate of  historical social 
science. In their stocktaking reviews they referred to the role of  the political cli-
mate for reform, held to have been favorable in the 1960s and 1970s. The role of  
sociology as a the major social scientifi c “partner” of  the history of  society is also 
referred to, as is the infl uence of  Marxism.27 In the formative period of  German 
historical social science, “for the most part socio-economic explanation patterns 
were favoured, whether under Marxist infl uence, or in the context of  moderniza-
tion approaches in history or in other forms.”28
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For the eighties, Wehler and Kocka mention the role of  the history of  everyday 
life briefl y and the role of  women’s and gender history as well. These had led to a 
“relativisation” of  the socioeconomic explanation patterns and to an acknowledg-
ment of  the importance of  the dimensions of  gender, experience, and meaning. 
For this reason history of  society had increasingly turned to the theorist of  social 
action Max Weber, who was now embraced as its pioneer (and soon after as its 
pillorist).29 Wehler attributed the increasing resistance to history of  society to a 
generation-specifi c transformation toward increasing individualization and emo-
tionalization. These two developments there were increasing “resistance to the ab-
stractness and alleged “coldness” of  process and structural analysis, in a period, 
. . . which has raised “being moved” and “sensitivity” to cult words. Contingent 
experience has gained the upper hand over structural determination.”30
In the 1990s, under the infl uence of  the global shifts in political power as a 
consequence of  the disappearance of  the former communist “Eastern Block,” a 
fundamental rediscovery and acknowledgment of  culture and tradition (in particular 
national, ethnic, and religious traditions) as central dimensions of  “society” could 
be observed. This applied likewise to the discipline of  history. “Culture” had be-
come the “new buzz word,” according to Wehler. Historians tended to leave so-
ciological and Marxist approaches aside, whereas Foucault—whom Wehler treated 
as an intellectual enemy—was given increasing recognition.31 Whereas twenty-fi ve 
years before cultural history had appeared particularly old-fashioned to historians 
of  society, it now suddenly turned into their major “challenge.” Quite unexpect-
edly, the former critics of  “traditional history” now themselves faced the critique 
of  being “no longer up-to-date.” Indeed, might they have found new relevance in 
Bob Dylan’s old lyric: “the times they are a changing.”
A remarkable characteristic of  Wehler’s and Kocka’s analyses of  historical social 
science and its challenges is the fact that both proceed mainly in a historicizing 
manner and refrain from actually dealing with the question about the cognitive 
legitimacy of  the criticism.32 They focus on the political and cultural causes of  the 
mounting critique and treat the cognitive causes of  the “crisis” of  history of  society 
only in passing. As a consequence the cognitive criticisms that have been raised 
against history of  society are named—for example, its relative neglect of  inten-
tions as the result of  its focus on non-intentional “structures”—but this critique 
is not being analyzed in cognitive terms. This is remarkable because historians of  
society have always propagated history of  society primarily with the help of  cogni-
tive arguments (and only secondarily with the practical history-as-Enlightenment 
argument33). History of  society was originally advertised as cognitively superior to 
“traditional” history because it had superior social scientifi c methods and theo-
ries at its disposal. Therefore there was no “rationally superior alternative.” Now, 
however, the cognitive rationality of  the latest developments in historiography was 
no longer refl ected upon—Thomas Kuhn’s theory of  “scientifi c revolutions” was 
no longer the frame of  reference—and the undeniable changing winds in histo-
riography were explained only on the basis of  their historical context. As for the 
“cultural” criticism of  history of  society, only its genesis was clarifi ed, and no 
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longer were issues raised concerning its validity. As a result the cognitive “crisis” in 
history of  society has remained to a large extent unexplored.
In the second half  of  this article I will try to shed some light on the cognitive 
problems German history of  society has been facing by analyzing some of  the 
conceptual issues involved. Many of  them derive from modernization theory and 
from the special path thesis as it is interpreted in terms of  modernization theory. 
Others derive from the radical criticism of  historicism. This criticism, I will argue, 
has in a fundamental way conceptually shaped the program of  German history of  
society through the phenomenon of  conceptual inversion.
I will substantiate my view by analyzing the consequences of  conceptual inver-
sions in the program of  the history of  society. These conceptual inversions are a 
consequence of  the theoretical “wars” waged by the historians of  society, which 
tend to result in the inversion of  the opposing position.
The paradigmatic case of  conceptual inversion is probably Marx’ materialistic 
inversion of  Hegel’s idealism, which also exemplifi es the problems involved in “in-
version.”34 My analysis will thus draw on a dialectical train of  Hegel’s thought, the 
“unity of  opposites.” This Hegelian idea reveals incidentally a surprising affi nity 
to certain sociological mechanisms formulated by Pierre Bourdieu, giving Hegel 
an unexpected contemporary relevance.35
My conceptual analysis will be limited to the level of  programmatic formula-
tions, because the basic conceptual strategies usually are fi xed by programs. How 
programmatic formulations look in practice is another, no less interesting question, 
which I will leave aside here.
Bourdieu’s sociology of  science is based on the insight that scientifi c programs 
(or ‘paradigms’) are never formulated in a vacuum, nor are they ever without com-
petitors. On the contrary, they nearly always refer implicitly or explicitly to other, 
competing scientifi c programs in the same “scientifi c fi eld.” This reference to com-
petitor programs creates the programs’ theoretical boundaries and fulfi ls a distinc-
tive function. In this way the identity of  a paradigm is defi ned and secured against 
competing paradigms by opposing them. This reference is mostly negative, because 
identity results—as Spinoza and Hegel argued long ago—from the negation of  
the non-identical (omnis determinatio est negatio, an idea systematically exploited by 
Foucault for history). The theoretical and methodological defi nitions of  scientifi c 
programs can be explained to a large extent by these reciprocal relations. The same 
applies to changes in problem defi nitions.
I would like to designate this “negative” defi ning reference to other paradigms 
as the reciprocal “negative bond” of  scientifi c programs. In science this “negative 
bond” is politically unavoidable, as it fulfi ls strategic functions in scientifi c contro-
versies. As in the “political fi eld,” in the “scientifi c fi eld” there is no struggle with-
out a strategy. However, epistemologically—which means cognitively—a “nega-
tive bond” also brings important negative consequences with it in the long term. 
This is because the methodological and theoretical views of  scientifi c programs to 
a certain extent embody negations, i.e., “inversions” of  the views they criticize.36 
And because in inversions the fundamental conceptual structure of  that which 
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has been inverted remains the same (just as the teleological structure of  history 
in Hegel’s idealism survived in its materialistic “inversion” by Marx), many of  
the conceptual problems connected with the criticized positions survive. They can 
subsequently develop into permanent “epistemological blockades,” demanding a 
new theoretical effort to overcome them. Again, the teleology in Marx’s concep-
tion of  history deriving from the inversion of  Hegel is a clear case in point.
Most problems of  history of  society that are discussed under the labels of  cul-
ture and “subjective meaning” are a direct consequence of  this kind of  inversion 
process. They derive from the “negative bonds” of  history of  society to two rival 
scientifi c programs at the time of  its formulation, that is, fi rstly to historicism and 
secondly—more subliminally—to Marxism. These two “negative bonds” have had 
serious consequences for the theoretical and methodological conception of  the 
Bielefeld program. The situation is even further complicated by an (indirect) posi-
tive bond between Marxism and history of  society in its formative phase, making 
this relationship utterly ambivalent.37
Below I will illustrate my thesis concerning “negative bonding” between scien-
tifi c programs on the basis of  two examples: fi rstly, the Bielefeld view on the rela-
tionship between structure and person—and in the same breath between society 
and culture—and secondly, the Bielefeld view of  historical explanation.
Person and Structure as a Problem of  Inversion
To introduce this problem, a few remarks on the relationship between person and 
structure in historicism, Marxism, and historical social science are fi rst called for.
In Bielefeld the historicist method was perceived and criticized as individualistic 
and as limited to intentions.38 This methodological orientation was simply inverted 
in the Bielefeld concept. Instead of  individualistic, the Bielefeld focus was to be 
supra-individualistic, and instead of  intentional it was to be “structural.”39 German 
history of  society shared this “structural” focus with the French history of  society 
of  Fernand Braudel and his circle, and with the English Marxist history of  society 
of  Eric Hobsbawm. This symbolizes what I meant by the (indirect) positive refer-
ence of  the history of  society to Marxism: their common “structural focus.”40
A “structural focus,” according to Kocka, directs “our gaze more on the condi-
tions, scope and possibilities of  human behaviour in history than on individual 
motives, decisions and actions; it examines collective phenomena rather than in-
dividuals; it takes as its subjects for research spheres of  reality and phenomena, 
whose meanings are worked out more through description and explanation than 
by a hermeneutical understanding of  individual meaning; it is primarily interested 
in the relatively permanent and “hard” phenomena which are diffi cult to change 
. . . the concept “structure”—understood in this sense—does not confl ict with 
“process” but with “event,” “decision,” “action,” and “personality.”41
At the same time the weighting of  the explanatory factors that distinguished 
historicism was inverted. Instead of  stressing the “effective” power of  intentions 
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and ideas, the historical power of  social structures, particularly of  “hard” eco-
nomic and social structures, was stressed. This distinction between “hard” eco-
nomic structures and apparently “soft(er)” cultural structures, and the explanatory 
primacy ascribed to the “hard” ones, betrayed a positive bond with Marxism in the 
late 1960s and the early 1970s.
This “inversion” of person and structure in history of society gave rise to a con-
ceptual tension with serious consequences arose between on the one hand individuals, 
their ideas and intentions—in short, subjective meaning and experience—and on the 
other hand the “objective structures” of “society.” Through inversion, “structures” in 
history of society had become synonymous with what was not “personal”: “supra-indi-
viduality” and “long-term processes.” “Structures” therefore also stood in opposition 
to individual intentionality and the individual ability to experience history as events, 
in short, in opposition to action and the dimension of experience in history.42 Ute 
Daniel’s criticism of history of society that history does not just “take place behind 
the backs and over the heads of the actors” is therefore justifi ed. The same applies to 
her plea for “a hermeneutical change” in order to be able to take methodologically 
into account the dimension of individual subjective meaning in history.43
In the language of  Jon Elster’s theory, the problem of  German history of  society 
can be formulated as follows: by focusing on the supra-intentional and the sub-in-
tentional levels—in opposition to the intentional focus of  historicism—German 
history of  society had to a large extent shut out the intentional level itself.44 The 
inversion of  historicism therefore had the fatal consequence that intentionality (and 
therefore action) itself  could no longer be grasped as structured, and that German 
history of  society was no longer “compatible” with the theories of  action as such—
action being intentional by defi nition. Wehler’s “confession” in 1996 that Weber 
for a long time had not been received by history of  society as an action theorist and 
therefore had been “split in half,” can be read as a confi rmation of  my analysis.45 
This moreover answers the theoretically decisive question not answered by Wehler, of  
why Weber had precisely been “split in half ” in this way in Bielefeld.
The far-reaching elimination of  the intentional level in history of  society was 
supported at the theoretical level by the French and English variants of  the history 
of  society (especially by Braudel and Hobsbawm). The difference between deep 
and surface levels of  history and the identifi cation of  “structures” with the deep 
level also originated in these inspiration sources of  the Bielefeld historians, with 
their open (Hobsbawm) or hidden (Braudel) orientations to Marxism. Structures 
were understood by Wehler as those phenomena that “determine the traditions 
and the freedom of  choice as well as the restrictive conditions with respect to 
individual and collective actions.”46 Because at the same time the Bielefeld School 
wanted to keep itself  free from any open form of  (Marxist) “determinism,” they 
could not formally posit a “structural causality”—as Marxists did—to solve the 
explanatory problem, although they did so in practice. In this sense history of  so-
ciety was clearly negatively bonded to Marxism. The public rejection of  any com-
prehensive theory of  explanation resulting from this “negative bond”—necessary 
to draw a programmatic boundary line vis-à-vis Marxism—also explains why the 
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historians of  society had to subscribe offi cially to “eclecticism” as far as explana-
tory theories were concerned, even if  they were not so eclectic in practice due to 
the explanatory primacy of  especially social and economic structures.
In the practical work of  the Bielefeld School we therefore usually see a kind of  
sociological “system causality” smuggled in, by which the actions of  individual and 
collective actors are explained as system-determined. Welskopp has analyzed this 
explanatory scheme as follows: “On the one hand the actors were usually pocketed 
for the system: as often unconscious executors of  structurally determined action, 
they disappeared behind the functional logic of  the system. On the other hand, with 
regard to the actors´ scope of  action, interest was mainly directed at their restrictive 
conditions. In this way social action, provided that it was in conformity with the 
system, mostly disappeared behind the structural determination of  the system.”47 
The connection, therefore, between system and action in history of  society could 
only be brought about at the expense of  subjectively meaningful action.
That this problem played not only a role in the formative phase of  historical 
social science—as for example in Wehler’s Kaiserreich and Kocka’s Klassengesellschaft im 
Krieg—has recently been argued by John Breuilly in his analysis of  Wehler’s Deutsche 
Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Wehler’s way of  explaining German history marginalizes the 
meaning of  actions and events, according to Breuilly, because his “structural” fo-
cus is fi xated on their conditions and results. This makes it diffi cult “to take into 
account the way in which events themselves produce structure-forming outcomes 
instead of  being merely an effect of  structures.”48 The most serious problem is that 
Wehler’s structural approach to history tends “to relegate actions to the role of  
shadows fl oating above the “higher” reality of  structures and refl ecting them.”49 If  
actions are understood as a refl ection of  structures, however, the contingency of  his-
tory tends to disappear: the only elements of  contingency are “those short moments 
when action can work as a power against or beyond structures.” The problem with 
this position is “that the structures themselves are not regarded as contingent.”50
In my view, this non-contingent perspective on structures—observed by both 
Welskopp and Breuilly but not explained by them—can be explained by Wehler’s 
subscription to the theory of  modernization, which ultimately understands his-
tory as an evolution of  structures, where the “fi nal stage” of  evolution is already 
assumed to be known: Western liberal democracy. In this regard, Marxism is actu-
ally a member of  the family of  modernization theories, even though it considered 
communism and not liberal democracy to be history’s “fi nal stage.”
So, paradoxically, in the end the problem of  “applying” modernization theory to 
history is the same as “applying” Marxist theories to history: they both harbor an 
implicit teleology ultimately deriving from the Hegelian (and the Christian) vision 
of  history. History conceptualized in this teleological mode ultimately remains a 
brand of  Heilsgeschichte. This implicit teleology, also in the form of  an “evolutionary 
logic” of  “systems” and “structures,” accounts for the elimination of  contingency 
that so many historians (with Breuilly) fi nd fundamentally problematic.51
In the way Wehler tried to “apply” modernization theory to German history, 
there is a discernible, though yet unnoticed systematic source of  tension between 
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action and system in German history of  society. The problem I am hinting at is 
that Wehler, in contrast to Habermas (from whom he derived so much of  his social 
scientifi c inspiration), did not ascribe to any conceptual difference between history 
and evolution.52 As a consequences in the case of  Wehler there is also no distinction 
between a historical analysis of  events and actions on the one hand and a theoretical 
reconstruction of  their developmental logic—as an evolution of  systems—on the 
other. That is why the reconstruction of  historical actions and the reconstruction of  
systems are telescoped into one another by Wehler in his syntheses of  modern Ger-
man history. And therefore there is an immanent theoretical “compulsion” in German 
history of  society to reduce actions to systems. The tendency, admitted by Wehler 
and Kocka themselves, toward a “structural” reductionism in the formational phase 
of  historical social science, was therefore no accident nor caused by any contingent 
circumstances, but was an immediate result of  the identifi cation of  history of  soci-
ety with “applied” modernization theory itself.
The absence of  a theoretical distinction in Wehler between history and evolu-
tion—in contrast to Habermas—derives in its turn from another programmatic 
source. I am referring to the self-defi nition of  history of  society as a non-narrative 
form of  history. As a consequence thereof, Habermas’ thesis that history always 
has a (time oriented) narrative form that differs from the reconstructive form of  
theories of  evolution, fi tted particularly badly into the methodological concept 
of  German history of  society, which had defi ned itself  precisely as non-narra-
tive, theoretical, and analytical.53 Since German historians of  society criticized 
“traditional” history as “mere story-telling,” Habermas’ thesis—following Arthur 
Danto—that all history is narrative and devoid of  theory, was for them not “com-
patible.”54 Against “traditional” history and Habermas they argued that history of  
society “applied” middle range theories in an “instrumental” way. Thus this deep 
inherent tension between the program of  German history of  society and its main 
social scientifi c source of  inspiration—Jürgen Habermas—could not openly be 
debated without jeopardizing simultaneously one of  its fundamental strategies of  
demarcation in relation to historicism. Eclecticism exacted its toll at the expense 
of  consistency, as often happens.
Summarizing, we can conclude that the tension in German history of  society 
between person and structure, that is between intentionality on the one hand and 
the supra-and sub-intentionality on the other, is the result of  a simple inversion 
of  what the Bielefeld School took for the relation between person and structure in 
traditional historicism. The later debates on the relationship between society and 
culture derive from the same programmatic source.
Society versus Culture?
Act I in these debates was staged in 1980 by representatives of  the history of  
everyday life. Historians like Hans Medick and Alf  Lüdtke essentially criticized 
German history of  society for ignoring experience and the dimensions of  meaning 
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of  history’s actors. At fi rst the targets of  this criticism did not take it very seriously 
or simply ignored it.55 However, this strategy of  negation has, in the long run, 
proved to be ineffective.
In Act II of  these debates about society and culture the repressed dimension 
of  subjective meaning returned in an explosive way.56 In these debates Ute Daniel, 
amongst others, argued that the collective actors in German history of  society 
were usually represented as acting in goal-rational or strategic ways. This was not 
accidental, because only in this way could meaningful subjective experience be ex-
plained as (goal-rational) action based on objective interests (especially organized 
class interests). And since these “objective interests” of  the actors were explained 
in terms of  the system—just as they were in Marxism—the actors’ subjective ex-
perience had to be of  the goal-rational sort. If  this was not possible, one spoke of  
“deviations” in need of  an explanation, similar to the problem of  “false conscious-
ness” in Marxism.57
In German history of  society the “system conformity” of  the actors was pre-
supposed to be the “normal case” that needed no explanation. Both Wehler’s 
Kaiserreich and Kocka’s Klassengesellschaft im Krieg exemplifi ed this mode of  analysis 
in a paradigmatic manner.58 In this typically sociological conception of  historical 
reality, cultural interpretation patterns have no systematic place, for the expla-
nation of  goal-rational action manages to do without them. This circumstance 
is of  course also the reason why a large part of  the theoretical social sciences 
presuppose goal-rational actors: as soon as the model goal-rational actor makes 
its appearance, the social scientist can start to theorize because the interpretation 
of  actual actor-intentions and meanings—that is, culture—becomes superfl u-
ous (in that the goal-rational intention is introduced by defi nition). Ute Daniel’s 
criticism that “system conformity” as a presupposition of  explanatory strategies 
shows more affi nity with Durkheim’s holistic functionalism than with Weber’s 
methodological individualism is basically correct, as are similar observations 
made by Welskopp.59
It is important to note that the functionalist strand in the Bielefeld School de-
rived from various sources and can also be seen as a consequence of  theoretical 
eclecticism. It derives both from the kind of  Marxism the Bielefeld School took 
over from the German émigré historians Eckart Kehr and Hans Rosenberg—whose 
Primat der Innenpolitik and Große Depression und Bismarkzeit had provided its paradigmatic 
examples of  how actually to write history of  society—and from the Durkheimian 
legacy in American structural-functional modernization theories.
Functional explanatory logic in history of  society could not simply be dropped—
despite the massive criticism in face of  its evident problems—because it was rooted 
in the primacy of  “system thinking” of  modernization theory. Moreover, “func-
tional-causal explanation” had been one of  the “identity markers” of  history of  
society vis-a-vis the primacy of  intentional explanation characteristic of  “histori-
cism,” so here too we see the consequence of  a “negative bond” (see below).
The “repression” of  the (cultural) interpretation patterns of  actors by struc-
tural-functional logic had grave consequences. The functional logic of  the “system” 
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was now more or less elevated to the “motor” of  history—just as in Marxism. His-
tory was primarily understood as an evolution of  systems, an evolution that could 
be explained by the theory of  modernization.60
Systems therefore advanced to the rank of  real historical actors in German 
history of  society—again revealing the earlier mentioned similarities between the 
Hegelian-Marxian concept of  history and modernization theory. As a result the 
real historical actors were relegated to the margin of  history, as Welskopp signal-
ized.61 This means basically that the opposition between structure and personality 
as such lives on in German history of  society. This circumstance explains why 
later, the analysis of  what consciously drives individuals—intentions and interpre-
tation; in short, the “subjective” dimension of  meaning or culture—has so easily 
ended up on the scrapheap of  German history of  society and has been opposed 
to structures.
To recap, the opposition of  structure and person has produced an unintended 
and fateful opposition between structure and culture that cannot simply be coun-
teracted by introducing culture as a new “extension” of  history of  society, as We-
hler has proposed. Wehler’s analytical differentiation of  culture in his Deutsche Ge-
sellschaftsgeschichte as the third “social” dimension, alongside power and the economy 
(and social inequality as an additional fourth dimension), did not solve this prob-
lem because culture was conceptualized once again as a separate sphere alongside 
others and not as the dimension of  subjective meaning of  every form of  social 
action. Wehler’s later, almost self-incriminating remark, that “it does not seem to 
bring much adding the previously neglected dimension of  culture complementa-
rily to the thematic areas dealt with up to now,” unfortunately does not change this 
uncomfortable situation.62
The “empty space” of  a comprehensive concept of  culture in German his-
tory of  society analyzed here may explain why Foucault’s concept of  history has 
met with so little sympathy in Bielefeld. Because it builds on a comprehensive 
concept of  culture and interprets all structures as culturally produced, Fou-
cauldian discourse analysis refers indirectly to this “empty space” of  culture in 
history of  society.
Historical Explanation as a Problem: 
The Inversion of  Understanding and Explaining.
My last analysis of  the effects of  “negative bonds” on German history of  so-
ciety concerns its idea of  historical explanation. An inversion process with se-
rious consequences can also be observed here: while the historicist idea of  a 
fundamental methodological dualism between understanding of  meaning and 
causal explanation was taken over in Bielefeld, its evaluation was simply reversed. 
Instead of  understanding hermeneutically, explaining in a causal and functional 
way was presented as the “royal road” for German historians of  society. The 
connection between understanding and explaining was never clarifi ed, however. 
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Actually, as intentional actions within German history of  society were already 
defi ned as objectively determined by the system, that is as goal-rational, the 
space for understanding in history of  society remained de facto void. Moreover, 
goal-rationality is the only intention that can be understood and theorized on the 
model of  causal explanation, because as Weber already clarifi ed, the goal-means 
relationship is identical to the cause-effect relationship. Historical explanation 
therefore was reduced to causal and functional explanation in Bielefeld not ac-
cidentally, but by necessity as a consequence of  the “negative bond” between 
German history of  society and “historicism.”63 The new interest in historical 
comparison in history of  society may be interpreted as an attempt to get fi nally 
rid of  this methodological bottleneck that has created so many problems—at 
least on the level of  theory.64
Alongside the mere inversion of  historicism, the “positive bond” with Marxism 
must be considered here as well. The justifi cation for the dominant role of  struc-
tures vis-à-vis the actors and their consciousness in German history of  society was 
namely the same as in Marxism, that is: the presupposition of  an irrevocable lack 
of  “real” knowledge of  the actors about their “actual” situation (alias the problem 
of  “false consciousness”). Again and again the justifi cation for structural explana-
tion in history of  society has been the reference to the force of  circumstances and 
coercive structures that make sure that “history never can be reduced to people’s 
mutual intentions” and experience. Behind the backs of  history’s actors, the real 
effective causes were the “hard” socioeconomic structures actually explaining ac-
tions—even if  they contradicted actual experiences. For “real” explanatory knowl-
edge of  actions, the knowledge and experiences of  the historical actors therefore 
were not needed, but rather the knowledge won by historians ex post of  the deter-
mining structures. Since these structures, however, are not given and cannot be re-
constructed from the partial and—from an explanatory point of  view—defi cient 
experience of  the actors, these structures had to be fi rst theoretically understood. 
Therefore in German history of  society it was theory and structure that were 
always conceived of  as internally related, not theory and action (which brings us 
back to the problem of  the “halved Weber”).
This presupposition at the same time explains why German history of  society 
could be conceived of as a critique of  ideology, implying the “enlightenment” 
of  those who were being studied (if  only ex post), exactly as was conceived of  in 
the critical social science of  Habermas. “Critical” history of  society was (at least 
also) represented as a remedy against the so-called “false experiences” of  “ideo-
logically blinded” subjects. Kocka’s argument for society instead of  culture as the 
central notion of  history of  society is still based on the argument that society 
takes into account the phenomena of  which contemporaries are not conscious 
better than culture.65 From the point of  view of  historians of  everyday life, this 
claim to superior knowledge over the actual actors would be open to the critical 
(and perhaps malicious) question whether this vanguard claim does not represent 
a form of  “Leninism in theory,” that, like Marxism, is in need of  a clear episte-
mological justifi cation.
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Conclusion
If  my analysis developed above holds water, there are good reasons to character-
ize the alliance between German history of  society and modernization theory as 
fundamentally ambivalent because this theory explains both the rise and the fall 
of  German history of  society—at least to a certain extent. Features that were 
considered to be strengths of  this theory in the optimistic 1960s and early 1970s 
turned into its weaknesses from the skeptical 1980s onward. This applies both to 
its cognitive as to its normative features. Analyses of  its normative context—po-
litical and cultural historicizations—as well as analyses of  its cognitive context are 
therefore necessary in order to explain the destiny of  German history of  society 
over the last four decades. In this essay I have indicated what a conceptual analy-
sis at the programmatic level may contribute to such a venture and how such an 
analysis helps us to understand the elusive phenomenon of  “paradigm changes” in 
the humanities.66
In retrospect, however, it is noteworthy that most of  the critical arguments 
against theory of  modernization and its “application” to history of  society were 
already developed back in its boom phase. That is why so many of  the later ob-
served problems concerning modernization theory could be traced back to We-
hler’s own arguments contra (such as the belief  in progress, the implicit idealization 
of  a “normal” Western way into modernity, and the identifi cation of  “society” 
and nation-state). In retrospect this grants Wehler’s book Geschichte und Modernisier-
ungstheorie a particularly paradoxical character because it was already carrying the 
seeds of  its own “destruction.” Fans of  Hegelian dialectics may relish this idea, 
and post-modern critics could argue that Wehler at the time had not taken his own 
criticism of  the belief  in modernity seriously enough. However this may be, one 
thing is sure: there was a fundamental ambivalence in Wehler’s arguments from the 
very beginning and an obscurity in his weighing of  the pros and cons of  modern-
ization theory. This obscurity has done little to prevent the later reversal of  the 
balance of  arguments, so much is clear too.
In addition, however, what has be taken into account is that the abandonment 
of  the special path thesis, observable from the 1980s on, is also partly based on 
the German historians of  society’s own empirical research. Although the special 
path thesis was for a long time defended vehemently against its critics, compara-
tive research of  German historians of  society has contributed decisively to its fi nal 
decline.67 In particular Kocka’s Bürgertum-project, which tried to pinpoint what the 
“special” orientation of  the German bourgeoisie really consisted of  by comparing 
the German cases with non-German ones, has to be mentioned in this context.68 
One could interpret this project cynically as a successful attempt by historians of  
society to undermine their own foundations, but one could more plausibly argue 
that this project testifi ed to a “risky” academic openness to test a “scientifi c hy-
pothesis” and a genuine willingness to learn from the facts.
The empirical work of  historians of  society has changed since the 1970s 
as a result and the original explicit focus on modernization theory and on the 
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explanation of  Germany’s “special path” has all but disappeared. Accordingly, 
the boundaries between history of  society and “normal” history have become 
very vague—which can also be explained as a success of  the original program.69 
A similar development can be observed in France with the Annales variant of  his-
tory of  society.70
It is remarkable, however, that the theory of  the history of  society has not kept 
pace with this “assimilation process” in practice and has become an impediment, 
just as an outdated fortress can become an impediment to a new line of  defense. 
Wehler distanced himself  repeatedly from his earlier interest in “theory” from the 
1980s onward—after it had helped him to fortify Bielefeld earlier on. This re-
nouncement, however, obviously did not work, because Schopenhauer’s argument 
concerning causality applies to “theory” as well: once one has stepped into its 
carriage, one can no longer stop it at will. The critical debates referred to above all 
show that trying to “step out of  the carriage of  theory” is not an effective strategy, 
especially not after having propagated “theory” oneself. Looking away from the 
source of  troubles may be understandable from a psychological point of  view, but 
does not help from a cognitive point of  view.
Only recently has the younger generation of  German historians of  society 
drawn this conclusion and embarked on a new theoretical course. Welskopp has 
explicitly abandoned old, undefendable theoretical positions in order to develop a 
new theoretical foundation for history of  society. The intention to think through 
the relationship between structure and action anew—following Max Weber, An-
thony Giddens, and Pierre Bourdieu—is of  central importance to this new effort. 
It is the fi rst systematic attempt to do away with the “splitting in half ” of  Weber 
on the theoretical level in German history of  society.71
After this theoretical “renewal” of  history of  society, presumably not much will 
be left of  the theory of  modernization. In this respect the “postmodern challenge” 
has changed modernist positions, though in no way does this mean that postmod-
ernism has replaced or will replace modern historiography.72 That said, the fatal 
episodes in German history in the twentieth century are no longer discussed in 
terms of  democratic versus non-democratic modernization, nor in terms of  the 
“lagging” behind of  political structures, but rather in terms of  “modernity and 
barbarism,” or in terms of  “barbarism in modernity.” The optimistic—Enlight-
enment—belief  that there is some necessary connection between modernization 
and “civilization”—as Norbert Elias tried to argue in sociology—is fi ghting a 
rearguard action.73 The view formulated by Zygmunt Baumann that the Holocaust 
is an integral part of  modernity gained the upper hand in the last decade of  the 
twentieth century, when civil war in Yugoslavia brought the horrors of  war back to 
Europe for the fi rst time since 1945 (that is, after the second “war to end all wars”). 
In this sense the twentieth century certainly turned out to be a practical “learning 
process” in the Habermasian sense.74
As a consequence, and at fi rst sight paradoxically, the signifi cance of  the Ho-
locaust for Western historical thinking concerning the twentieth century has 
for two decades been increasing instead of  decreasing. This means that those 
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approaches in history that pass over or touch only marginally upon the idea of  
barbarism in modernity are increasingly experienced as “besides the point” and 
are losing plausibility.
This especially holds for modernization theories that were applied to twenti-
eth century German history because they focus on the different forms of  politics 
(democratic versus non-democratic) and not directly on the contents of  politics 
(genocidal versus non-genocidal)75. This enabled historians in the twentieth cen-
tury to regard “1933” as an “undemocratic” benchmark of  modern German his-
tory without having to confront the Holocaust itself  directly. With regard to the 
Holocause, the theory of  modernization permitted what Norbert Frei has aptly 
called “the discretion of  the unconcrete”—a “blind spot” it shared with Marx-
ism.76 Since the 1990s, however, this “discretion” has been eroded by the usual 
interest of  historians in the concrete. This development is best documented by 
the fact that now the whole spectrum of  perpetrators has followed the victims 
of  the Holocaust into the picture at last, so that both are getting concrete faces 
now in history.77
From the point of  view of  postmodernism, the problem can be stated as 
follows: theories of  modernization can criticize certain aspects of  modernity 
and modernization, but not question modernity and modernization as such.78 
Modernization as such is positively evaluated and modernization theory is actu-
ally in this sense a direct heir of  Enlightenment optimism. Marxism represents 
the “inverted” Hegelian version of  this Enlightenment optimism and shares the 
fate of  modernization theory in general. Therefore, from this theoretical view-
point, the Holocaust could not be analyzed as a phenomenon belonging to “nor-
mal” modernity. Either it had to be connected with a premodern phase of  social 
evolution—as a “non-synchronous residue” or as an atavism—or be explained 
as some form of  deviation from “normal” modernity. The fundamental am-
bivalence of  modernity—the not very reassuring Janus head of  modernity and 
barbarism—can not be recognized and accounted for in the terms of  modern-
ization theory.
So the problem with modernization theory, including its Marxist variants, is in 
the end that it remains a version of  the optimist Hegelian (and Christian) “killing 
fl oor” view of  history. This view may recognize the horrors of  history—Hegel 
surely did, as did Marx—but represents them as events that are ultimately contrib-
uting to the progress of  world history and thus as meaningful—in ways unknown 
to the actual actors in history. If  concrete human beings may experience their 
life as living on a trapeze and their end as their fi nal drop, thenHistory—with a 
capital H—is ultimately represented in this view as a safety net under all trapezes. 
Especially the history of  the fi rst half  of  the twentieth. century has robbed this 
view of  whatever plausibility it ever had: it demonstrated ad oculum that history’s 
safety net in practice does not work very well and may contain only millions of  
corpses. That is why modernization theory—especially when applied to twentieth 
century German history—looks so implausible and “unmodern” at the beginning 
of  the twenty-fi rst century.
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